California's Sex Offender Notification
Statute: A Constitutional Analysis
The recent proliferation of sex offender registration and
community notification statutes raises a number of constitutional
issues respecting the rights of convicted offenders. Although
politically popular, such statutes may he an ineffective means of
protecting children, while unduly burdening the constitutional rights
of those persons subject to the statute's requirements. This
Comment analyzes the constitutional issues implicated by sex
offender registration and notification statutes, and examines the
underlying public policy concerns which the statutes seek to
address.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 29, 1994, seven-year old Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted
and murdered in New Jersey. 1 The man charged with the crime lived
across the street from Megan's family.2 Unknown to Megan's family,
or to other neighbors, he was a convicted pedophile. 3 Understandably,
the community, as well as the country, reacted with outrage.
In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the New Jersey Legislature
responded swiftly. Only three months after Megan's murder, New
Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman signed into law a package of
bills known as "Megan's Law." 4 The law requires, among other things,
that convicted sex offenders register with local law enforcement
agencies. 5 The requirement applies both to offenders paroled from
prison and to those given a sentence of probation. More controversial

I. James Popkin, Natural Born Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19,
1994, at 65, 66.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2C:7-l to -11 (West 1995). See also Joseph F. Sullivan,
Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994,

at Bl.
5.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 1995).
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is the new law's mandate of notification to the community in which a
violent or repeat offender lives. 6 The statute provides guidelines by
which sex offenders are to be assigned to one of three risk levels, or
"tiers."7 Those in the first tier are classified as low risk and are not
subject to public notification. Moderate risk offenders are subject to
notification to community organizations, including schools and church
and youth organizations. The highest risk offenders in the third tier are
subject to notification to all "members of the public likely to encounter"
the registrant. 8 The registration and notification provisions apply to the
convict for his lifetime, and apply to offenders convicted prior to the
enactment of the laws as well as to current offenders. 9
In response to similar heinous crimes, other state legislatures have
passed strict sex offender registration laws. 10 About half of these

Id. § 7-8.
Id.
8. Id. § (c)(3).
9. Id. § 7-2. A provision is made for the registrant to petition the Superior Court
to terminate the obligation to register. The registrant must prove that he has not
committed an offense for 15 years. Id. § (c)(4)(f).
10. Washington's statute was passed in response to public outcry after Westley
Allen Dodd's sexually motivated murder of three children. Sex Offender Registration
Law Pits Victims' Rights Against Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, I 993, at 5
[hereinafter Sex Offender Registration Law]. The passage of California's sex offender
notification legislation was virtually assured after the 1993 kidnap and murder of 12year-old Polly Klaas by a convicted sex offender. See Tupper Hull, Polly Case Huge
Boost to Anti-Crime Bill, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 11, 1993, at A5.
Only Nebraska and Vermont do not currently have a sex offender registration statute.
In both states, two bills were introduced in 1995, but were not enacted into law. The
other states' statutes are: ALA. CODE §§ 13a-l l-200 to -203 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821-24 (West Supp.
1995); ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie 1995); COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ I 8-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102r (West I 995); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21-.23 (West Supp. 1995);
GA. CODE ANN.§ 42-9-44.l (1994); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 707-743 (1995); IDAHO CODE
§§ 18-8301 to -831 I (1995); !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150 (Smith-Hurd 1993);
IND. CODE ANN.§ 5-2-12 (Burns Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE§ 692A (1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4910 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.510-.540 (Baldwin
1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 15:540-549 (West Supp. 1995); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34-A, §§ 11001-11004 (West Supp. 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B (1995);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 37 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 28.721-.732 (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1995); MISS.
CODE ANN.§§ 45-33-1 to -15 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 566.600-.625 (1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-23-501 to -508 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.155
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 632-A:12-A:19 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-l lA-l (Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW§ 168 (McKinney Supp. 1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 14-208.5 to-208.13 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-32-15 (1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2950 (Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587
(West 1989 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 181.507-.509 (1989 & Supp. 1994); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9791 (1995); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3-400-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 22-22-30 to-39
6.
7.
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include some form of community notification, 11 The provisions of each
statute vary as to length of time imposed 12 and the crimes to which the
provisions apply. 13 A federal statute passed in 1994 requires states to
enact sex offender registration laws conforming to the guidelines set
forth. 14 Under these guidelines, a state that fails to implement a
program by September 13, 1997 will lose ten percent of the federal
crime control funds which it would otherwise be entitled to receive. 15
The federal registration program does not mandate notification to the
community. It does, however, require that the information be made
available to law enforcement agencies and to government agencies
conducting confidential background checks, and that a specific
registrant's information may be released to the community at the
discretion of local law enforcement officials. 16 The federal statute also

(Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (Supp. 1995); TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-13c.l (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-27-21.5 (Supp. 1995);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130
(West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE§ 6J-8F (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.45
(West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT.§§ 7-19-301 to -306 (1995).
11. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington all
have notification provisions. These provisions range from discretionary release of
information to the public by local law enforcement as necessary to protect the public,
to limited notification to schools and child-related organizations, to mandatory
community notification. The reader should note that these states' provisions are as of
1995, and that the body of law respecting sex offender notification is rapidly changing.
12. Connecticut's registration provision applies for only one year, Utah's for five
years. Michigan's has a duration of 25 years for a first-time offender, and for life after
a second conviction. Most states have a limit of ten years. Several, like Michigan,
mandate a longer period of registration for more serious offenses. The reader should
note that these provisions are as of 1995, and may since have been amended.
13. Some statutes, such as those of Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, and
Maryland, apply only to sex offenses against minors. A few states have statutes which
apply to misdemeanors, such as Alabama (indecent exposure) and South Carolina
(indecent exposure and "peeping"). See supra note I 0.
14. 42 u.s.c. § 14071 (1994).
15. Id. §§ (t)(l), (t)(2)(A). An additional two years may be granted by the
Attorney General if the state is making a good faith effort to implement the program.
Id.
16. Id. § (d)(3).
After this Comment was completed, but prior to publication, an amendment to 42
U.S.C. § 1407l(d) was enacted. The new language requires states to "release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public" regarding registered sex offenders.
See H.R. 2137, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); S. 4921, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
The bill, called "Megan's Law," was signed by President Clinton on May 17, 1996. See
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limits the period of time during which the offender is required to
register. The registrant must comply with the requirements for ten
years from the date of his release from prison, or from the date he is
placed on parole or probation. 17
California's sex offender registration statute was originally promulgated in 1947. 18 Registration is mandatory for any person convicted ofan
enumerated offense since July 1, 1944 in any court, including federal
and military courts. 19 The registration requirement applies to the
offender for life, while residing in Califomia. 20 The statute also
requires that the registrant submit blood samples which will be filed in

Ron Fournier, Clinton OKs Mandate on Molester Warnings, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
May 18, 1996, at AIO.
The amendment does not, however, specify what information shall be released, to
whom it must be released, or how the states should determine which registered offenders
will be subject to the notification mandate. In Senate debate on the proposed law,
Senator Gorton stated that"[ e]ven with this mandate ... state and local law enforcement
officials ... retain the substantial discretion to determine when community notification
is called for, what information to release, and how best to inform the community." 142
Cong. Rec. S4921-01 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b){6)(A).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 290 (West 1995).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 290(a) (West 1995). The enumerated offenses are CAL.
PENAL CODE§§ 207(b) (kidnaping a child under 14 for the purpose of committing lewd
or lascivious acts); 208(b) (kidnaping of a child under 14, except by a parent); 220
(assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, rape in concert with
another, lascivious acts upon a child, or penetration of genitals or anus with foreign
object); 243.4 (sexual battery); 261 (rape under any of the following circumstances: upon
mentally disordered person, accomplished against a person's will, upon a person unable
to resist because of intoxicating or anesthetic substance, upon an unconscious person, or
where accomplished by use of threats to retaliate); 262(a)(l) (rape of a spouse where it
is accomplished by use of force or violence); 264.1 (rape or penetration by foreign
object); 266 (enticement of unmarried female under 18 for purposes of prostitution);
266c (unlawful sexual intercourse); 266j (procurement of child under age 16 for lewd
or lascivious acts); 267 (abduction of person under 18 for purposes of prostitution); 285
(incest); 286 (sodomy); 288 (lewd or lascivious acts with child under age 14); 288a (oral
copulation with person under age 18); 288.5 (continuous sexual abuse of a child); 289
(penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign object against the victim's will by
means of force); 311.2 (b)(c)(d) (sending or bringing into state for sale, printing,
exhibiting, distributing, or possessing matter depicting sexual conduct by minor); 311.3
(depicting by film, photograph, videotape, etc. sexual conduct by person under age I 8);
311 .4 (employment or use of minor to perform prohibited acts); 311.10 (advertising for
sale or distribution obscene matter depicting a person under age 18); 311.11 (possession
or control of matter depicting minor engaging in sexual conduct); 647.6 (annoying or
molesting child under 18); 314 (lewd or obscene conduct, indecent exposure, obscene
exhibitions); 272 (causing, encouraging or contributing to delinquency of persons under
18 years, where lewd and lascivious conduct is involved); 288.2 (second conviction for
harmful matter sent with intent of seduction of minor); or, any conviction for the attempt
to commit any of the above mentioned offenses.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 290 (a)(]) (West 1995).
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a DNA databank accessible by law enforcement agencies. 2 I In 1994,
a provision was added authorizing public dissemination of registrants'
information. 22 The provision includes a "900" number which the
public may utilize to identify registered sex offenders. 23 A subdirectory, organized by county and zip code, is to be available in local law
enforcement offices providing the name, photograph, physical description, and age of offenders deemed to be "habitual" offenders. 24 Access
to the subdirectory is given to any person with an articulable purpose. 25
Neither the 900 number nor the subdirectory may give the offender's
exact street address. 26 The notification provisions only apply to those
offenders convicted of certain sex offenses against children. 27
When legislation is enacted in response to an emotionally charged
public campaign, there is a risk that the issue will not be rationally
debated and carefully considered. 28 Few elected officials are willing to
incur the wrath of their constituency by voting against such bills. Sex
crimes are particularly reprehensible to the American public. Sex crimes
against children are so abhorrent that even among prison populations, the

21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1995). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a similar statute in Oregon which was challenged as an unconstitutional violation
of the offender's Fourth Amendment rights. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.
1995).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1995).
23. Id. § (a)(3).
24. Id. A person convicted of two or more of the crimes enumerated in§ 290(a),
with at least one involving a minor, is considered "habitual" for the purposes of the
statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 13885.4 (West 1995). For a listing of the enumerated
offenses, see supra note 19.
The subdirectory was completed in February, 1996 and contained profiles of 912
habitual offenders, or about 2.5% of all registered sex offenders. See Shante Morgan,
List of Sex Offenders Released, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 10, 1996, at A3.
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1995). See Peter Rowe, Parents Sure to
Shudder at this Book of Horrors, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 25, 1996, at DI. Lt.
Ray Sigwalt of the San Diego Police Department's Family Protection Section is quoted
as "urg[ing] concerned parents and employers to visit their local police or sheriff's
station and ask for the book." Id. Presumably, the fact that one is a concerned parent
or employer is a sufficient articulable purpose and those persons will be given access to
the directory.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 290.4 (West 1995).
27. Id. The offenses are CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 261, 266, 267, 207(b), 286, 288,
288a, 288.5, 289, 647.6, and 208(d) where the offenses are committed against minors.
See supra note 19 for a description of the offenses.
28. See Jerry Gray, Sex Offender Legislation Passes in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1994, at B6; A "Megan's Law"for New York?, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at
Al6 [hereinafter "Megan's Law"].
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child molester is at the "bottom of the social totem pole."29 A California bill calling for harsh sentencing of first time violent sex offenders
became a divisive issue in the 1994 California gubernatorial campaign.
Candidates were accused of not being genuinely interested in creating
sound legislation to address a serious problem, but instead of using the
issue for political gain. 30
The New Jersey Senate passed Megan's Law "with only token
debate," 31 and the Assembly scheduled a vote on five of the ten bills
"without a customary committee hearing."32 A critic of New York's
sex offender legislation criticized the legislature for leaving the question
of the bills' constitutionality to the courts: "It would be better for the
legislators to exercise their own judgment and not pollute the system
with laws that are empty gestures in a highly emotional climate."33 In
Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, a case challenging Megan's
Law, the court stated:
Well-intentioned legislators, responding to public outcry, have sought to
confront serious social issues------sexual crime and recidivism. These were, are
and remain vital issues of concern to every member of our society. But,
however well-intentioned, all laws must pass constitutional muster. The role
of the judiciary is a difficult one. It does not involve policy-making,
legislating, or otherwise reacting to public pressures. Rather, it requires an
impartial review of those legislative actions based upon constitutional principles
created by the Founders of this great nation. 34

This Comment will examine the constitutional issues applicable to sex
offender statutes, and particularly to the California notification provisions. Part II will analyze constitutional challenges which rest on the
premise that the notification requirements constitute punishment,
including the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Eighth Amendment Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Part III looks at constitutional issues of Due
Process, the Right to Privacy, and Equal Protection. Part IV addresses
some policy concerns and assumptions underlying sex offender statutes,
and whether the goals of these statutes are likely to be achieved. Part
V concludes with a brief overview of alternatives to sex offender

29. Erica Goode, Battling Deviant Behavior, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Sept.
19, 1994, at 74.
30. See John Marelius, Rape: It's Now a Hot Campaign Buzzword, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRJB., Aug. 9, 1994, at Al. Of the proposed "one-strike" law, Professor Robert
Pugsley of Southwestern University School of Law said, "It's political gangbusters, but
it's shortsighted." Id. at A13.
31. Gray, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. "Megan's Law," supra note 28.
34. 876 F. Supp. 666, 670 (D.N.J. 1995).
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notification provisions and some suggestions for a less constitutionally
burdensome, but effective statute.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SEX OFFENDER NOTIFICATION
STATUTES BASED ON THE PUNITIVE ELEMENT

A.

Do Notification Requirements Impose Punishment?

A constitutional challenge to a statutory requirement under the Ex Post
Facto Clause, 35 the Bill of Attainder Clause, 36 the Double Jeopardy
Clause,37 or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 38 requires a
finding that the statute imposes punishment. Where a law does not have
a clear punitive purpose, courts may look to the effect of the law to
determine whether, in its application, it is punitive or regulatory. 39
Even when legislatures state that the law's purpose is regulatory or
remedial, courts will scrutinize the law to determine if its impact is,
nevertheless, punitive. 40
Courts faced with this task in cases challenging the constitutionality
of sex offender statutes have begun their analysis with the factors set
forth by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 41 The

35. U.s. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1979); United States
v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1993).
40. Huss, 7 F.3d at 1447-48.
41. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). But see Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367, 399 (N.J. 1995) (observing that "the Mendoza-Martinez 'test' is not
relevant to our analysis" in evaluating the constitutionality of Megan's Law). The Doe
court argued that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are properly utilized only to determine
whether proceedings are civil or criminal. Id. at 397 n. I 4. However, in MendozaMartinez the factors were used by the Court to conclude that the sanction imposed by
a federal statute was penal, and therefore triggered constitutional procedural safeguards.
372 U.S. at I 84. In United States v. Halper the Court stated that "in determining
whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes
actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding
giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated." 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989)
(emphasis added). Such an evaluation utilizes the Mendoza-Martinez factors, especially
the first, fourth, sixth, and seventh factors. See also Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp.
744, 752-54 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (utilizing the Mendoza-Martinez factors to invalidate
a Washington sex offender statute under the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution).
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seven factors articulated by the Court are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment----;-etribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.42

Each of the Mendoza-Martinez factors will be considered separately as
they have been interpreted by courts and applied to sex offender
statutes. 43 While many sex offender registration laws have been in
effect for years, most notification provisions are relatively recent;
consequently, there are few reported cases. 44 However, cases addressing the constitutional validity of registration statutes contain a useful

42. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
43. Several courts have decided cases challenging sex offender statutes without
engaging in the regulatory-punitive analysis, simply presuming that such statutes are
punitive. See, e.g., State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); In re
De Beque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441 ( 1989).
44. Two cases challenging the constitutionality of Megan's Law are referred to
extensively throughout this section of this Comment: Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J.,
876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995), and Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). Artway,
invalidating the notification provisions of Megan's Law, was decided on February 28,
I995. Doe, upholding the same provisions, was decided nearly five months later, on
July 25, 1995. Anway has been appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and
Doe has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although a federal court ruling in
constitutional cases generally overrides a state court ruling, New Jersey's Attorney
General has argued that the Artway holding applies only to the individual offender who
brought the case. See Joseph Wharton, Court Upholds Megan's Law, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1995, at 36. See also Michelle Ruess, Megan's Law Goes to Top Court, N.J. R.Ec., Oct.
25, 1995, at Al (citing the comments of Professor Frank Askin of Rutgers Law School
that it is expected that if the Third Circuit affirms Artway, the U.S. Supreme Court will
grant certiorari to hear both cases).
Author's Note: Shortly after this Comment was completed, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals issued its decision in the Artway appeal. Artway v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 81
F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 594 (1996). The majority of Artway's
claims relating to notification were dismissed as unripe, because he had not yet been
subjected to the notification requirement. Id. at 1242. Because the constitutional issues
respecting community notification were not addressed, the Third Circuit opinion
contributes little to the analysis in this Comment. The court engaged in an exhaustive
discussion of the test to determine whether a sanction constitutes punishment, id. at
1254-63, and rejects the Mendoza-Martinez factors as "too indeterminate and unwieldy."
Id. at I 263. The court goes on to adopt a three-prong test which analyzes (I) the actual
purpose of the sanction, (2) the objective purpose of the sanction, and (3) its effects. Id.
The second prong includes the determination of whether the "measure has traditionally
been regarded as punishment." Id. The effects prong looks at the degree of negative
repercussions caused by imposition of the sanction, regardless of its justification. Id.
Whether the difference between these factors and the Mendoza-Martinez factors is
simply a matter of semantics is debatable. The Third Circuit Court acknowledged that
"the law in this area, hke an adolescent's room, needs tidying." Id. at I 251.
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analytical framework applicable to notification statutes and will be
employed in this Comment.

1.

Does public notification involve an affirmative
disability or restraint?

While registration of sex offenders has generally been found to be a
minimal burden to the individual, the addition of public notification
provisions has been found to impose a greater stigma on offenders,
which can detrimentally affect their personal and professional lives,45
employability,46 associations with neighbors,47 and choice of housing.48 The Supreme Court of California held in In re Reed that the
lifetime registration requirement imposed a "lifelong burden" on the
offender and subjected him to increased police scrutiny. 49 Thus, while
public notification laws have a regulatory purpose of assisting law
enforcement, they also have a significant punitive element.
The degree of public dissemination of information is clearly relevant
to this inquiry. In an Arizona case challenging a sex offender law, State
v. Noble, the court did not find notification to be an affirmative
disability or restraint because the registrant's information was available
only to law enforcement agencies and, in limited circumstances, to
potential employers. 50 However, as the number of individuals with
access to such information increases, so does the burden on the
individual offender.

45. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Alaska 1994).
46. Artway v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 876 F. Supp. 666,688 (D.N.J. 1995).
47. Id.
48. See Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child
Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J. L. & POL'Y 569, 580-81 (1995) (arguing
that community notification forces offenders to move from the community due to
harassment or eviction, resulting in migration of offenders to inner cities).
49. In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 920-22, 663 P.2d 216, 218-19, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658,
660-61 (1983). Justice Mosk likened the increased burden of police scrutiny to the final
scene of the film Casablanca in which the inspector gives orders to "round up the usual
suspects." Id. at n.5.
50. State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Ariz. 1992).
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2.

Has public dissemination of a person's criminal record
historically been regarded as punishment?

Historically, public humiliation and stigma were punishments for a
number of crimes. 51 The California Supreme Court in In re Birch
called sex offender registration an "ignominious badge carried . . . for
a lifetime." 52 Even courts that have found registration statutes not to
be punitive have nevertheless agreed that registration has traditionally
been regarded as punitive. 53
Although the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Ward disagreed
with the Noble court's finding that registration was traditionally viewed
as punitive, they did not distinguish between registration and community
notification. 54 The Ward court stated that "[r]egistration is a traditional
governmental method of making available relevant and necessary
information to law enforcement agencies" and supported this statement
with reference to statutory requirements that drivers notify the Department of Motor Vehicles of address changes, a requirement that could
hardly be described as a stigmatizing event. 55 The Ward court's view
is unpersuasive for its failure to address the notification provision of the
Washington statute as distinct from mere registration.
Courts may disagree as to whether registration for law enforcement
purposes is historically regarded as punishment. However, to the extent
that the information is disseminated to the public for non-regulatory
purposes, the resulting stigma and humiliation clearly contain traditional
elements of punishment.
3.

Do notification provisions affect individuals only on a
finding of scienter?

Registration and notification requirements are triggered by conviction
for sex offenses. Such conviction requires a finding of knowingly

51. See Michelle P. Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender
Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right" to Know,
48 VAND. L. REV. 219, 224-25 (I 995); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet
Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L. J. 1357,
1360-62.
52. In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314,322,515 P.2d 12, 17, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212,217
(1973).
53. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1222.
54. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1994).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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wrongful conduct, and is indicative of the punitive effect of the laws. 56
Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that notification is
punitive.
4.

Does community notification promote traditional aims of
punishment--retribution and deterrence?

Registration of sex offenders with law enforcement agencies has a
clear regulatory purpose. But notification statutes go beyond mere
registration and seek to deter recidivism by convicted offenders.
Legislatures have claimed that the public must be allowed to protect
themselves and their children from dangerous offenders. It follows that
because the law only applies to convicted offenders, it is clearly intended
to deter those offenders from committing another crime. 57
The Ward court acknowledged that deterrence might be a secondary
effect of registration, but declined to hold that "such positive effects"
were punitive. 58 Legislatures may, understandably, be reluctant to
specify that such statutes are for deterrent purposes, and risk being
invalidated by the courts. 59 Notwithstanding a legislature's insistence
that notification statutes are solely regulatory, the underlying assumption
that such requirements will protect children from recidivists indicates a
clear deterrent purpose.

56. See Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378-79 (D. Alaska 1994) (this factor
is indicative of a punitive effect, but is given light weight in the balance). But see
Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 690 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that
because of the disagreement as to the recidivism rate of sex offenders, the court must
defer to the findings of the legislature and find that this factor weighed in favor of the
regulatory nature of Megan's Law).
57. See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 690; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379; State v. Noble,
829 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134, 139 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990).
58. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
59. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 389 (N.J. 1995) ("We assume that if the
legislative purpose was to deter sex offenders, the law would be invalid."); see also Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 ("[D]eterrence [is] not [a] legitimate nonpunitive
governmental objective[].").

1205

5.

Is the behavior to which notification provisions
apply already a crime?

This factor seeks to distinguish regulatory statutes from penal statutes
by inquiring whether the restrictions or requirements imposed are
applicable only upon conviction of a crime, or whether they merely
regulate conduct incident to a legitimate state purpose, without regard to
past criminal conduct. For example, the Supreme Court found that a
double tax imposed on liquor dealers who had been convicted of a crime
was punitive, not regulatory, because their criminal conviction was the
sole reason for the additional assessment. 60 The court in Artway v.
Attorney General of New Jersey, invalidating the notification provision
of Megan's Law, found that because the restriction was imposed on the
basis of prior criminal behavior, it was indicative of the penal nature of
the challenged statutes. 61

6. Is there an alternative purpose assignable to
notification provisions to which they may be rationally
connected? Does the requirement appear to be excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned?
The last two Mendoza-Martinez factors are considered together.
Justice Stein, dissenting in Doe v. Poritz, states that these two factors
"consistently are referred to as a shorthand test for determining
punishment. " 62 The inquiry is "whether the legislature intended
punishment, and if not, whether the restriction is rationally related to a
legislative goal and not excessive in relation to that goal.''63 It has long
been recognized that, notwithstanding a legislature's stated regulatory
purpose, the effect of the statute as applied must be evaluated to
determine whether it is in fact punitive. 64 Courts agree that legitimate,
non-punitive purposes exist for sex offender registration statutes. 65
Such statutes aid law enforcement in protecting the public from

60. United States v. Lafranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931). Accord United States
v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935).
61. Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 691 (D.N.J. 1995); see
also Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Alaska 1994); In re Reed, 33 Cal.
3d 914,922, 663 P.2d 216,219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658,661 (1983). But see United States
v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an Oregon statute
prohibiting felons from carrying firearms did not constitute punishment for past conduct).
62. 662 A.2d 367,433 (N.J. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Huss, 7 F.3d at 1447-48.
65. See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 691-92; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379-80.
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convicted offenders whom the legislature has determined to be a threat
for potential recidivism. 66
However, the Artway court and the court in Rowe v. Burton also
agreed that notification provisions go beyond justifiable law enforcement
purposes. 67 Public dissemination of information on registered sex
offenders is excessive in relation to the legitimate purpose of facilitating
law enforcement. 68 It has been argued that public dissemination of
registrant's information encourages citizens to engage in private law
enforcement and vigilantism. 69 Professor Arthur Miller has warned that
resort to such methods "exemplifies a breakdown in the criminal justice
system" and admits the failure of law enforcement to control sex
offenders. 70
The fact that the statutes challenged in State v. Noble 71 and People
v. Adams72 authorized release of registrant's information solely to law
enforcement agencies was critical to those courts' findings that sex

66. See Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 691-92 (D.N. J.
1995); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1379-80 (D. Alaska 1994). See also In re
Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,922, 663 P.2d 216, 219-20, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661-62 (1983).
The Reed court found that the legislature may have reasonably intended that sex offender
registration serve as a law enforcement tool, but questioned whether that purpose was
being served by the present administration of the law. Id. at n.7.
The New Jersey legislature declared that the purpose of Megan's Law is "to protect
the public by increasing community awareness of the risk involved .... " Artway, 876
F. Supp. at 691. The legitimacy of this purpose has been questioned by many critics.
See Montana, supra note 48 (arguing that Megan's Law fails to achieve its declared
legislative purpose). See also discussion infra Part IV.
67. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 691-92; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1379-80.
68. Id.
69. Edward Martone, Mere Illusion of Safety Creates Climate of Vigilante Justice,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 39; Doug Conner, Did Flyer on Sex Offender Release Invite
Vigilantism?, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at AS. Arguing against a community
notification provision to the federal sex offender statute, Congressman Nadler of New
York asked, "Of what use is this information? Ifwe are going to mandate the release
of information to the public, it should be with information that someone can do
something with." 140 CONG. REC. H5613 (daily ed. July 13, 1994). See discussion
infra Part IV.
70. Edward R. Silverman, A Modern-Day Scarlet Leiter for a Sex Offender, NAT'L
L. J., Aug. 31, 1987, at 8.
71. 829 P.2d 1217, 1222-24 (Ariz. 1992). The court stated "[o]ur decision is
close" but nonetheless found the statute nonpunitive because registrant's information was
kept confidential. Id. at 1224.
72. 581 N.E.2d 637,641 (Ill. 1991). See also State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531,533
(N.H. 1994) ("This information is held confidentially within the law enforcement
community.").
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offender registration was not punitive. While the Ward court found
registration was not excessive in relation to a non-punitive goal, again
they failed to address whether the notification provision had any effect
on their analysis. 73
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, upholding Megan's Law, argued
that a punitive effect of a law renders it punishment only if the sole
explanation for that impact is punitive intent. 74 The court argued that
a law characterized by the legislature as regulatory must be considered
regulatory despite a punitive impact, "if that impact is simply an
inevitable consequence of the regulatory provisions themselves."75
However, this holding is contrary to a line of cases considering the
question of whether a statute is regulatory or penal in nature. 76
The Mendoza-Martinez factors establish a useful framework within
which courts may evaluate whether a statute is regulatory or punitive.
From the foregoing analysis of the cases challenging sex offender
statutes, it is clear that courts weigh in favor of finding the registration
requirements not punitive, but find that the notification provisions are
punitive, and therefore amenable to constitutional challenges.
B.

Is California's Notification Provision Punitive?

Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, it is likely that a California
court would find the notification provision to be penal in nature. As
discussed in the foregoing analysis, the statute imposes an affirmative
disability or restraint on the convicted offender. Public dissemination of
a person's criminal past results in stigmatization and has traditionally
been regarded as punishment. Notification affects individuals only on
a finding of scienter, upon conviction for sex offenses which require a
finding of knowingly wrongful conduct. Notification is aimed at
deterrence, a traditional goal of punishment. The requirement is imposed
upon conviction of a crime, rather than merely as a regulatory measure.
And, while the legislative intent may not have been to punish, its effect
is nevertheless punitive.
Although there are no reported cases yet challenging the new
notification law, those addressing the registration provision have found

73. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1994).
74. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 390 (N.J. 1995).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-50 (1989) (holding that
legislative intent is not the exclusive test to determine whether a statute was punitive);
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) (using a two-part intent-effects test
to determine whether a statute was punitive).
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the registration provision to be punitive. 77 It follows that because of
the greater burden imposed by the notification provision, a similar
conclusion will result. The fact that California's provision applies to the
offender for his lifetime will no doubt weigh in favor of a finding that
the requirement is punitive.
California's notification provision does not require local law enforcement agencies to disclose the presence of a convicted sex offender to his
community. Rather, the information is simply made accessible to
persons with legitimate concerns regarding a specific person. The
California law does not allow the exact street address of the registrant
to be disclosed. These provisions lessen the burden of the California
registrant, but clearly the burden is still greater than if he were only
required to register, which has been found by California courts to be
punitive.
With the threshold question of punishment met, the question becomes
whether the punishment is of a degree sufficient to invoke constitutional
protections for those persons subject to public notification provisions.
C.

Do Retroactive Sex Offender Statutes Violate the Constitutional
Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws?

The U.S. Constitution prohibits any State from passing an Ex Post
Facto law. 78 Although the Ex Post Facto Clause does not use the term
"punishment," it has been interpreted since 1798 to apply to laws
imposing punishment, 79 thus prohibiting states from enacting laws that
inflict greater punishment for a past criminal act than the law attached
to the crime at the time it was committed. 80
Most sex offender notification statutes apply retroactively to convicted
offenders. 81 California's notification provision subjects all offenders

77. See, e.g., In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,922,663 P.2d 216, 220, 191 Cal. Rptr.
658, 662 (1983); People v. Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 177, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411, 414
(1978); In re Birch, IO Cal. 3d 314, 321-22, 515 P.2d 12, 16-17, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212,
216-17 (1973).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § IO, cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto
Law ... ").
79. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (I 798).
80. Id. at 390.
81. Of the 25 states with notification provisions, only Colorado, Georgia, Indiana,
Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee are not retroactively applied. See
supra notes I 0-11. The federal statute does not require states to apply their registration
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convicted since July I, 1944 of the enumerated offenses to the notification requirement. 82 If public disclosure of registrant's information is
found to impose punishment, then the statute imposes greater punishment
to prior criminal convictions, and therefore becomes vulnerable to ex
post facto scrutiny. 83
In Calder v. Bull, the Court articulated standards for evaluating
whether a law was invalid under the Ex Post Facto Clause.84 Justice
Chase listed four types of laws he considered to be within the prohibition as ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict
the offender."

Justice Chase's third classification of invalid ex post facto laws is
applicable in evaluating sex offender notification laws. The Supreme
Court restated the Calder standards in Beazell v. Ohio:
[A]ny statute ... which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission ... is prohibited as ex post facto . . . . (T]he criminal
quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by
the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not
be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the
accused. 86

Retroactively applied notification statutes clearly violate the ex post
facto prohibition under the Calder standards. Retroactive notification
provisions subject offenders to punishment greater than that which
attached to the crime when it was committed. In challenges to
notification statutes, Alaska and Louisiana courts have invalidated the
laws as violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 87 The Artway court

statutes retroactively. See supra notes 14-17. Admittedly, such statutes would have no
present effect if they only applied to persons convicted after the law became effective.
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1995). For a list of enumerated offenses see
supra notes 19 and 27.
83. See Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 673 (D.N .J. 1995)
(where a statute is retroactive on its face, the court must engage in ex post facto
analysis).
84. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
85. Id. at 390.
86. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1925). The Calder standards were
reaffirmed in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1989).
87. Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994); State v. Babin,
637 So.2d 814, 824 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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similarly found that Megan's Law, where retroactively applied, violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 88
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Noble 89 found that the
Arizona registration statute was both retrospectively applied and
burdensome to the individual affected, but held that the statute did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because registration did not constitute
punishment. 90 However, the court clearly indicated that the addition of
a community notification provision would tip the balance in favor of a
finding of unconstitutionality. 91 The unavailability of registrant's
information to the public was also a decisive factor for the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in State v. Costello. 92 The court held that the
New Hampshire registration statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.93 The federal statute requiring states to implement a sex
offender registration program does not require states to apply the law
retrospectively. 94
California's sex offender registration statute was enacted in 1947 and
applied to those convicted since July 1, 1944.95 There have been no
reported cases challenging the registration statutes based on a violation
of the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, the notification statute, effective
July 1, 1995, applies to all offenders convicted of any of the enumerated
offenses since July 1, 1944. 96 The statute is clearly retrospective on its
face. To the extent that registration has been found punitive, it is certain
that under the standards articulated by the Supreme Court, 97 the
California notification provision, as retroactively applied, would be
invalidated as an ex post facto law.
The legislative purpose of community notification statutes, to aid law
enforcement in protecting the public by informing those likely to
encounter a recidivist, would be severely undermined if the statutes only
applied to those who committed crimes after the law was enacted.
However, legislators should not ignore such fundamental individual
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. l 995).
829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. l 992).
Id. at 1220-21, 1224.
Id. at 1224.
643 A.2d 531,533 (N.H. 1994).
Id.
42 u.s.c. § 14071 (1994).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1995).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (West 1995).
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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rights as the Framers explicitly provided for in the Constitution.98 In
Landgraf v. U.S.!. Film Products, Justice Stevens observes that
"retroactive statutes raise particular concerns.
The Legislature's
unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly
and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political
pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or
individuals."99
California's sex offender notification statute is facially retroactive,
imposing punishment which did not attach to the crime at the time it was
committed. Clearly, the legislature has identified a serious problem and
has attempted to remedy it. However, constitutional mandates cannot be
ignored. The law should be found invalid under the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The California Legislature should fashion a scheme which is not
constitutionally prohibited, and yet is effective in achieving its worthy
purpose. 100

D.

Do Sex Offender Notification Statutes Violate the Constitutional
Prohibition Against Bills of Attainder?

The United States Constitution explicitly prohibits the States from
passing any Bill of Attainder. 101 A Bill of Attainder is defined as a
legislative act that applies to ascertainable individuals or groups, which
imposes punishment on them without a judicial trial. 102 The Bill of
Attainder Clause was intended as an implementation of the separation of
powers doctrine, preventing legislatures from usurping the function of
the judiciary. 103 The Supreme Court in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services noted that a "major concern that prompted the bill of
attainder prohibition [was] the fear that the legislature, in seeking to

98. Justice Stein, dissenting in Doe v. Poritz, writes that "settled Constitutional
principles... are neither negotiable nor flexible." 662 A.2d 367, 441 (N.J. 1995). He
cautions that Constitutional values must transcend current societal pressures. "Today,
our concern is with prior sex offenders; in the l 950's the legislative concern focused on
Communists; and in the I 860's Congress was determined to punish legislatively those
who had supported the Confederacy." Id.
99. Landgraf v. U.S.!. Film Products, 51 I U.S. 244 (1994).
I 00. See discussion infra part V.
IO I. U .s. CONST. art. I, § I 0, cl. I.
102. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1991).
I 03. For a history of the bill of attainder doctrine, see Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen.
Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473-75 (1977). See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447
( I 965) ("the evil the Framers ... sought to bar: legislative punishment, of any form or
severity, of specifically designated persons or groups."). The Brown Court found that
a law prohibiting a Communist from holding a position as an officer of a labor union
violated the bill of attainder clause. Id. at 461-62.
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pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly
to assume the mantle of judge-or worse still, lynch mob." 104
Traditionally, the Bill of Attainder Clause applied to general retributive acts of a legislature towards specific groups or persons. 105
However, the Court in United States v. Brown held that the Bill of
Attainder prohibition was also applicable to preventive legislation. 106
The Court in Nixon applied a three-part test to determine whether the
challenged Congressional act constituted punishment within the scope of
the Bill of Attainder doctrine. 107 First, the historical test inquired
whether the punishment imposed was traditionally judged to be
prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. 108 These punishments
include death, imprisonment, banishment, punitive confiscation of
property, and laws barring certain desifated persons from engaging in
specified employment or vocations. 1 9 The second test looks at
whether the statute reasonably furthers a non-punitive purpose. 110 The
third test asks whether the statute evidences a legislative intent to
punish. 111
Applied to sex offender notification statutes, the Nixon tests and case
law interpreting the Bill of Attainder doctrine do not result in a
conclusive finding of unconstitutionality. Historically, punishments
entailing public humiliation were not within the scope of the Bill of
I 04. Nbcon, 433 U.S. at 480.
I 05. The Jaw found to violate the bill of attainder clause in Brown was directed at
Communists. 381 U.S. at 461. But see DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)
(holding that a New York statute prohibiting a convicted felon ftom holding office in
any waterfront labor organization did not violate the bill of attainder clause because the
restriction was "incident to a regulation of a present situation," not a punishment for past
activity).
I 06. Brown, 381 U.S. at 458. The Court found that punishment within the meaning
of the bill of attainder clause included not only retributive punishment, but "rehabilitative, deterrent--and preventive" as well. Id. But see Justice White's dissent in Brown,
arguing that the Court should defer to legislative findings: "[T]he Court implies that
legislation is sufficiently general if it specifies a characteristic that makes it likely that
individuals falling within the group designated will engage in conduct Congress may
prohibit." Id. at 463. The Nixon Court likewise warned that too expansive a reading of
the bill of attainder doctrine would "invalidat[e] every Act of Congress or the States that
legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals."
433 U.S. at 471.
107. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473-80 (1977).
108. Id. at 473-75.
109. Id.
I 10. Id. at 475-78.
111. Id. at 478-80.
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Attainder prohibition. The Nixon Court interpreted the Bill of Attainder
Clause less broadly than the Brown Court, clearly indicating that
legislative findings should be deferred to in the absence of clear punitive
intent. They found that some detrimental effect was tolerable where
there were legitimate non-punitive purposes the legislature sought to
achieve. 112
Judicial deference to legislative findings that public
awareness of likely recidivists will aid in protecting the public will result
in holdings that notification provisions do not violate the Bill of
Attainder Clause.
Nor does the politically motivated nature of sex offender notification
statutes necessarily invalidate the laws. The Court in Artway v. Attorney
General of New Jersey found that, "[a]lthough Megan's Law was
enacted in response to public disgust[,] . . . such a fact alone is not fatal
to the act's survival." 113 While a challenge under the Bill of Attainder
Clause, standing alone, will not invalidate public notification laws,
relevant concerns are raised which should be considered when evaluating
the validity of such laws.
The Artway court found that the punitive effects of Megan's Law did
not fall within the punishments banned by the Bill of Attainder
doctrine. 114 California courts have not ruled on whether sex offender
statutes violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. However, California's
notification entails a lesser degree of notification than does Megan's
Law. If the courts are persuaded by the Artway decision, it is unlikely
that they will find the degree of punitive effect severe enough to fall
within the scope of the Bill of Attainder doctrine.
E.

Do Retroactive Sex Offender Notification Statutes
Violate the Constitutional Prohibition
Against Double Jeopardy?

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that no person
will be "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." 115 The Supreme Court defined the scope of the Double
Jeopardy Clause in United States v. Halper: "[P]unishing twice, or
attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense. "116 The plaintiff in Artway argued that Megan's Law, retroac-

I I 2. Id. at 469-70.
I 13. 876 F. Supp. 666, 684 (D.N.J. 1995).
114. Id.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The provision is made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
I 16. 490 U.S. 435,442 (1989) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,399
(1938)).
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tively applied, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because he was
convicted and punished for his offense and then subjected to another
punishment, public notification, for the same offense. 117 Of course,
only retroactive notification provisions are amenable to double jeopardy
analysis. Multiple punishments for a single crime may be authorized by
the legislature and do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 118 The
Halper Court stated that "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
multiple punishments for the same offense." 119 The third of these
abuses is at issue in sex offender notification challenges.
The threshold question is whether notification provisions constitute
criminal penalties. The Supreme Court in Halper found that a civil
penalty imposed subsequent to a criminal penalty was punitive in nature
and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 120 The Halper case involved
a monetary civil penalty which the Court found had "no rational relation
to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss," and as such,
"cross[ed] the line between remedy and punishment." 121
Sex offender statutes may be similarly viewed. Mandatory registration
with law enforcement agencies clearly serves a remedial goal and does
not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Notification to the community, however, crosses the line between remedy and punishment and serves
no greater law enforcement purpose than does the registration requirement. The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that retroactive
notification provisions, if punitive, would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 122 The Artway court discussed the double jeopardy concerns
of Megan's Law, but declined to reach a conclusion because it found the
Ex Post Facto Clause to be dispositive of the case. 123

117. Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 685 (D.N.J. 1995).
118. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983).
119. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
120. Id. at 448-49. As discussed earlier in this Comment, notification provisions
are clearly punitive when analyzed under the Mendoza-Martinez factors. See supra notes
41-77 and accompanying text.
121. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989).
122. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,392 n.12 (N.J. 1995). The Doe court found that
notification did not impose punishment and did not implicate the double jeopardy clause.
See supra note 41.
123. Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 685 (D.N.J. 1995).
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In a case challenging the Washington Sexually Violent Predator
statute 124 the court held that the statute violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause because it subjected the offender to a second punishment for the
same crime. 125 Even though the statute was classified as "civil" and
had a remedial purpose of treatment for the offender, the court employed
the Mendoza-Martinez factors to establish that the statute was punitive
within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 126 Admittedly,
involuntary civil confinement imposes a greater burden than does
community notification. But the same analysis is applicable to the
double jeopardy determination as to the ex post facto analysis. 127
Statutes invalidated under the Ex Post Facto Clause should also be found
invalid under the Double Jeopardy Clause; where a second punishment
is imposed for the same crime, the statute violates the prohibition against
double jeopardy on its face.
F.

Do Sex Offender Notification Statutes Violate the
Constitutional Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment?

The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishment." 128 Originally, "cruel and unusual punishment" encompassed "something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like." 129
The meaning has evolved over time. Courts have never defined the
exact scope of "cruel and unusual" but have generally considered
punishment which is excessively lengthy or severe or which is disproportionate to the crime committed to be within the Eighth Amendment
prohibition. 130 In Trop v. Dulles 131 Chief Justice Warren wrote that
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. . . . [T]he words of the Amendment are not precise, and ... their

124. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West Supp. 1995). The statute allows the
state to involuntarily confine offenders, after serving their criminal sentence, if they are
deemed to be sexually violent.
125. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 753-54 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding that
involuntary civil confinement after the offender had served his prison sentence was
double jeopardy).
126. Id. at 752-54.
127. See, e.g., id. at 754.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
129. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,368 (1910).
130. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,331 (1892).
131. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 132

In Solem v. Helm 133 the Court adopted a proportionality test to determine whether a punishment was cruel and unusual, 134 but this approach
was rejected just a few years later in Harmelin v. Michigan as "an
invitation to [the] imposition of subjective values." 135 Justice Scalia
asserted that the Eighth Amendment did not contain a proportionality
guarantee, but that proportionality was simply a factor to consider in
extreme circumstances, usually in the context of capital punishment
cases. 136 The Court has not articulated a clear standard for determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. However, since most state Constitutions contain a
similar clause, state courts have developed clear tests of cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of their own Constitutions.
Many state and federal courts have had the opportunity to rule on the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as it is implicated by sex offender
registration and notification statutes. 137 While the Harmelin holding
may preclude proportionality challenges to the federal prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment, most states also have a similar clause in
their constitutions. 138 Mandatory registration of convicted sex offenders has not been found to be cruel and unusual except in two California
cases involving misdemeanor convictions. 139 However, in In re

132. Id. at 100-01 (footnote omitted). In Trop the punishment found to violate the
Eighth Amendment proscription was denationalization, involving no physical punishment
at all. Id. at IOI.
133. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
134. Id. at 284.
135. 501 U.S. 957, 986 (1991).
136. Id. at 962-65.
137. See. e.g., People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (I!l. 1991) (finding
registration was not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Douglas, 586 N.E.2d I 096,
I 098-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding registration was not cruel and unusual). Both
the Adams and Douglas courts were persuaded by the fact that registrant's information
was not made public. See also Artway v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 67779 (D.N.J. 1995) (discussing the implications of the cruel and unusual punishment clause
to Megan's Law, but declining to rule whether notification was cruel and unusual
because it found the ex post facto challenge to be dispositive of the case).
138. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("Cruel or unusual punishment may not be
inflicted or excessive fines imposed.").
139. See In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 925-26, 663 P.2d 216,222, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658,
664-65 (1983) (holding that the registration requirement was disproportionate to a
conviction for soliciting lewd or dissolute conduct from an undercover vice officer in a
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DeBeque, where a misdemeanor conV1ct10n for indecent exposure
involved two young boys as victims, a California court found that
registration was not cruel and unusual punishment. 140 California courts
have consistently used a proportionality test to evaluate claims of cruel
and unusual punishment. 141 In In re Lynch the California Supreme
Court adopted a three-prong proportionality test to analyze punishments
challenged as cruel and unusual. 142 The Lynch test, first, examined
"the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to
the degree of danger both present to society," second, "compare[d] the
challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed in the same
jurisdiction for different offenses which, by the same test, must be
deemed more serious," and third, compared "the challenged penalty with
the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions
having an identical or similar constitutional provision." 143
Applying the Lynch analysis to the California notification provision,
a court may very well find that they need go no further than the first
inquiry. 144 The DeBeque court stressed that legislation enacted to
protect children was entitled to great deference. The court distinguished
the case from In re Reed, 145 a case which found the registration
requirement disproportionate to a conviction for soliciting lewd or
dissolute conduct from an undercover vice officer in a public restroom.
The DeBeque court noted that the crime for which DeBeque was
convicted required a "motivation of abnormal sexual interest in children"
in contrast to Reed's "relatively minor sexual indiscretion between
adults." 146 The holding in DeBeque was based on an application of the
Lynch analysis to the specific facts of the case and to the mens rea
required by the statute in order to convict. Since all of the crimes which
trigger the notification requirement concern sexual abuse of children, 147

public restroom); In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 320-21, 515 P.2d 12, 16-17, I 10 Cal.
Rptr. 212, 216-17 (1973) (holding that registration was excessive punishment to the
petitioner's conviction for lewd or dissolute conduct stemming from a police officer
observing him urinating in a dark parking lot at I :30 a.m.). But see People v. King, 16
Cal. App. 4th 567, 576, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 220, 225 (1993) (finding that registration
imposed for a misdemeanor conviction for indecent exposure was not cruel and unusual
because of the particularly aggressive and hostile behavior of the offender).
140. In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 2d 241, 353-54, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441,448 (1989).
141. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
142. Id. at 425-27, 503 P.2d at 930-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-28.
143. Id.
144. See In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241,249,260 Cal. Rptr. 441,445 (1989)
("[A]pplication of the first prong alone may suffice in determining whether a punishment
is cruel and unusual.").
145. In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
146. In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 250-51, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
147. See supra note 27.
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it appears unlikely that under this first Lynch prong a California court
would find notification cruel and unusual. 148
The Lynch court explained that the underlying premise of the second
prong of its analysis was that a finding of disproportionality renders a
statute suspect as "generated in response to transitory public emotion."149 The DeBeque court did not find the registration requirement
defective under this second prong, deferring to the legislature's
designation of crimes likely to be committed by recidivists and
assignment of penalties it deemed appropriate to the gravity of the
crimes. 150
Notification may very well be considered differently. Notification
only applies to those enumerated crimes involving sexual abuse of
children. 151 Conviction for sex crimes against adults requires the
offender to register, but he is not subject to the notification provisions.152 The only other criminal convictions which require the
offender to register are arson 153 and certain drug offenses, 154 but
there is no notification provision for these registrants. Whether these
disparities indicate that public notification is a disproportional penalty for
convicted sex offenders is a difficult question. The legislature's
determination that persons convicted of any of the crimes requiring
registration display a high rate of recidivism cannot be easily dismissed.
It could be argued that the public has a right to know if there is a
murderer, rapist, drug dealer, or arsonist living in their neighborhood as
much as they have a right to know if their neighbor is a convicted child

148. See, e.g., People v. Monroe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 1212, 215 Cal. Rptr. 51,
57 (1985) (holding that the registration requirement for a conviction for annoying or
molesting a I 0-year-old girl was not cruel and unusual because of the serious nature of
the crime. The court wrote that such a requirement for this crime "does not shock the
conscience or offend fundamental notions of human dignity.").
149. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 426, 503 P.2d 921, 931-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
227-28 (1973).
150. In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251-52, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441, 446-47
(1989). But see infra notes 203-212 and accompanying text (because of the inconclusive
studies on recidivism, which is a fundamental assumption of sex offender notification
statutes, individual consideration of particular circumstances of a case may result in a
finding that notification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in certain cases).
151. See supra notes 19 and 27.
152. See supra note 19.
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.l (West 1995). The statute provides that the
information on registrants shall not be open to the public.
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11590 (West 1995).
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molester. 155 The definition of crime and assignment of penalties is a
legislative function, and courts often "tread lightly when approaching
matters within the unique province of the Legislature." 156 However,
the fact that only certain convicted sex offenders are subject to the
public notification provision is an indication of disproportionality which
should be evaluated by courts, together with other factors, to determine
whether the penalty is cruel and unusual within the constitutional
meanmg.
The third prong of the Lynch test is similar to the second. However,
under this inquiry the penalty challenged is compared to those imposed
for the same crime in other jurisdictions. A finding of disproportionality
is indicative of the penalty's excessiveness within the meaning of "cruel
and unusual." 157
Of the forty-eight states with sex offender registration statutes, twentyfive have some provision for community notification. 158
These
provisions allow for varying degrees of public dissemination of
registrant's information. 159 The virtually unlimited public access to
registrant's information in California places it among the more onerous
of the notification provisions.
The second and third prongs of the Lynch proportionality test weigh
towards a finding of unconstitutionality of California's notification
provision. However, it must be noted that the courts in cases challenging the registration statutes have overwhelmingly favored the first

155. It is true that legislatures, in addressing a particular crime which they seek to
prevent, need not fashion a remedy for all other crimes as well. See, e.g., United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 474 (1965) ("[T]his Court has long recognized ... that a
legislature may prefer to deal with only part of an evil.") (White, J. dissenting).
156. In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241,251,260 Cal. Rptr. 441,447 (1989).
157. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,427, 503 P.2d 921,932, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,228
(1972). But see also State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134, 140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting defendant's claim that the disproportionality of Arizona's registration statute
rendered it unconstitutional. The court went on to say that "[t]o hold otherwise would
make it virtually impossible for a state to be on the leading edge in passing laws
increasing punishment for criminal offenses.").
158. See supra notes I 0-13.
159. Eight states allow local law enforcement to release information they have
determined to be necessary for the protection of the public; these are Alaska, Colorado,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, and Tennessee. Delaware,
Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Dakota disseminate information only
to schools and child-related organizations such as daycare providers. California, Idaho,
Kansas, New York, North Carolina, and Oregon provide unlimited access to the public,
through registries available in law enforcement offices, or 900 numbers. Only five
states, Arizona, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington mandate public
notification through publication in newspapers or written notices distributed throughout
the community. See supra note 19.
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prong. 160 Because of the serious nature of the crime and the moral
culpability of the offenders, these courts have declined to find registration statutes to be cruel and unusual. 161 The added burden of public
notification would certainly alter the analysis, but it may not be found
to be so burdensome as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The
fact that the registration provision is effective for the lifetime of the
offender was troublesome to the DeBeque court, which urged the
legislature to revise this shortcoming of the statute. 162 Viewing the
growing number of notification provisions in sex offender statutes
enacted by the states, a court could be persuaded that this represents the
"evolving standards" spoken of by the Court in Trap v. Dulles. 163
However, many of the harshest notification schemes have been found
unconstitutional, albeit on grounds other than instances of cruel and
unusual punishment. 164 California's notification provision is arguably
less burdensome than mandatory notification to the community, because
it requires affirmative action on the part of the citizen requesting the
information. This factor may mitigate the "cruel and unusual" aspects
of the statute, and combined with the substantial deference shown to
legislative findings on the subject of child sexual abuse, it is unlikely
that a California court would invalidate the notification statute as
violative of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
III.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES: DUE PROCESS, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION

The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no State shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 165 Sex offender statutes have been challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of liberty and as a denial of equal protection of the

160. See, e.g., People v. Monroe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 1214, 215 Cal. Rptr. 51,
57 (1985).
161. Id.
162. In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241, 255-56 n.9, 260 Cal. Rptr 441,449 n.9
(I 989).
163. 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
164. See Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994); Artway v. Attorney
Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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laws. This section looks at these issues as implicated by sex offender
notification provisions.
A.

Substantive Due Process and the Right to Privacy

In a line of cases from Griswold v. Connecticut 166 to Eisenstadt v.
Baird 167 to Roe v. Wade, 168 the Supreme Court has found a "right to
privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty. In
Whalen v. Roe, the Court recognized two types of protected privacy
interests: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." 169 The first of these two
interests is relevant to sex offender notification statutes. Before an
analysis of whether a statute violates due process is appropriate, it must
be determined whether the liberty interest, here privacy, is constitutionally protected. The Whalen case involv.ed personal information that was
not otherwise publicly available. The Court held that a New York State
Health Department data compilation on users of certain prescription
drugs did not violate the privacy rights of those users because the
information was not publicly available, and because access to the
information was strictly limited. 170 A question arises in the context of
sex offender notification statutes whether there is a protected privacy
interest in public information. The court in Rowe v. Burton found that
convicted sex offenders did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information required to be publicly disclosed by the Alaska
registration act. 171 The Rowe court observed that "residences, job
locations, drivers license number, date of convictions, and nature of the
convictions are ... considered public information ... not ... traditionally protected from disclosure by the federal right to privacy." 172
Likewise, in Doe v. Poritz the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
information disseminated to the public pursuant to Megan's Law was not
constitutionally protected. 173 However, the Doe court acknowledged
that disclosure of a registrant's home address implicates a privacy
interest, especially where such disclosure could result in unsolicited

166.
167.
168.
169.
I 70.
171.
172.
173.
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
Id. at 600-04.
Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (D. Alaska 1994).
Id.
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 406-07 (N.J. 1995).
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contact. 174 They also noted that the notification law "links various bits
of information ... that otherwise might remain unconnected," but that
on the whole, the state interest in public disclosure outweighed the
registrant's privacy interests. 175
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in United States Dep i' of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press. 116 A unanimous
Court held that disclosure of criminal information contained in F.B.I.
history files could reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of
personal privacy within the meaning of the Freedom oflnformation Act,
even though the information was a matter of public record. 177 Of
particular relevance to public disclosure of registered sex offenders'
information is the following statement from Reporters Comm.:
The very fact that federal funds have been spent to prepare, index, and maintain
these criminal-history files demonstrates that the individual items of information
in the summaries would not otherwise be "freely available" either to the
officials who have access to the underlying files or to the general public ....
[T]he issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain
information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that
information. Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and
local police stations ... and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information."'

Case law addressing disclosure of public information as a violation of
an individual's right to privacy provides no clear rule. However, two
California courts found that the respective plaintiffs stated a cause of
action for invasion of privacy for the publication of their prior criminal
convictions, even though the information published was accurate and,
admittedly, in the public record. 179 While the courts in Conklin v.

174. Id. at 411.
175. Id. The Doe court believed that the inclusion of penalties for the use of
registrant's information for unlawful purposes or harassment justified the disclosure of
such information in spite of registrants' privacy rights. Id. at 409. The court's
confidence may be misplaced, as incidents of vigilantism have resulted from public
disclosure of the identities and addresses of convicted sex offenders. See infra notes
221-24 and accompanying text.
176. 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, 150 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1978) (holding that
a newspaper article revealing that the plaintiff had been convicted 20 years earlier for
murdering his brother-in-law invaded his privacy, exposing him to contempt, ridicule,
mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal.

1223

Sloss and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass 'n conceded that recent crimes
were newsworthy, they found that identification of actors in reports of
past crimes served little public purpose. 180 However, in a California
case challenging the registration statute as a violation of the right to
privacy, the court was not so generous. 181 In People v. Mills the court
made this harsh statement: "[Plaintiff] also argues [that] the registration
requirement deprives him . . . of his right to privacy. This may well be
true, but any person who ... physically molests ... a seven-year-old
child, has waived any right to privacy. . . . The argument is without
merit." 182 Several years later, the same court rejected a privacy
challenge to the registration requirement for convicted drug offenders in
People v. Hove. 183 In Hove, the court found that the law did intrude
on the registrant's privacy, but that the intrusion was not substantial,
noting that the law was "designed to minimize the intrusion into
individual privacy" by strictly limiting access to the information to law
enforcement personnel. 184
The foregoing analysis of case law lends support for at least the
possibility that a court in California would find a protected privacy
interest implicated by the notification provision, thus necessitating a
balancing of those privacy interests and the public interest. Where a
protected liberty interest is implicated, due process requires that a statute
bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state interest to be served,
and that the means are reasonable to accomplish that desired objective.185 Protection of children from recidivistic child molesters is a
compelling state interest, and courts have allowed legislatures broad
latitude in fashioning appropriate remedies. 186 Registration of sex
offenders deemed likely to recidivate is a reasonable means of accomplishing the state objective, because it aids law enforcement officials in
monitoring such persons. But the inquiry must now be whether public

3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (finding that publication of plaintiffs
criminal conviction for hijacking eleven years after he was convicted was not
newsworthy and constituted an invasion of his privacy, subjecting him to humiliation and
ridicule).
180. Conklin, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 244-45, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 123; Briscoe, 4 Cal. 3d
at 536-37, 483 P.2d at 39-40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72. The Briscoe court called it a
"crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once public never becomes private again." Id.
at 539, 483 P.2d at 41, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
181. People v. Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171,181,146 Cal. Rptr. 411,417 (1978).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. People v. Hove, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1003, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (1992).
184. Id. at 1007 n.7, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297 n.7.
185. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-600 (1977).
186. See, e.g., In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241,251, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441,447
(1989).
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disclosure of registrant's information substantially furthers the state
purpose any more than does registration alone, so that the burden upon
the registrant's privacy interests is justified. Many critics of community
notification have argued that more harm than good is done by these
statutes and that they will result in greater, not less, danger to the
public. 187
Legislative acts designed to remedy a fsarticular social evil are entitled
to a presumption of constitutionality. 1 8 Where statutes represent a
legislative policy decision, courts are reluctant to invalidate the
legislation unless it is unmistakably unconstitutional on its face. 189
While hesitant to tread into the Legislature's domain, courts nevertheless
have a duty to review acts which implicate constitutionally protected
rights.
A court reviewing California's notification provision might consider
whether the safeguards included in the statute mitigate the burden on the
registrant's privacy. The California statute prohibits the release of the
registrant's home address. 190 Penalties are imposed on persons who
use the disclosed information to commit a felony or misdemeanor. 191

187. See Montana, supra note 48, at 584-85 (arguing that notification interferes with
the rehabilitation of the offender); Sandi Dolbee & Mark Sauer, Religion & Ethics:
Redemption, Repulsion, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Nov. 3, 1995, at El, E4 [hereinafter
Dolbee] (forcing offenders out of one neighborhood "simply transfers the problem").
James Boren, a director of the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, said
of Louisiana's notification statute: "What you're doing is setting these offenders up for
complete failure .... They'll get out and soon realize that no matter what they do,
they're seen as evil, so they might as well be evil." Sex Offender Registration Law,
supra note I 0.
188. See People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 174, 534 P.2d 1001, 1006, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 102 (1975).
189. See, e.g., id. The Wingo court stated that" [t]he doctrine of separation of
powers is firmly entrenched in the law of California, and a court should not lightly
encroach on matters which are uniquely in the domain of the Legislature. Perhaps
foremost among these are the definition of crime and the determination of punishment."
Id.
190. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 290.4 (a)(2), (b)(l) (West 1995).
191. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (c) (West 1995). Callers to the 900 number are
warned that it is illegal to use the information obtained to commit a crime against the
registrant, discriminate against the registrant, or engage in harassment against the
registrant. Id. § (a)(4)(c)(v). Justice Stein, dissenting in Doe v. Poritz wrote that the
expectation that information obtained about registrants would be used responsibly was
"simply unrealistic." 662 A.2d 367, 439 (N.J. 1995). "[G]iven the normal range of
human emotion one reasonably could anticipate that notice of the presence of a sex
offender will trigger fear, suspicion, hostility, anger, evasive behavior [and] ostracism."
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Finally, rehabilitated offenders may avail themselves of a legal
proceeding to terminate the registration requirement. 192 Clearly, the
legislature designed the statute to lessen the burden on the individual's
privacy by including these safeguards, but the burden is still substantial.
The question remains how disclosure of sex offender registrants'
information aids law enforcement in protecting the public, or the public
in protecting themselves. Certainly, if parents know the identity and
whereabouts of a convicted child molester, they can warn their children
to avoid him. 193 And, neighbors can alert police to suspicious activities of the registrant, or to excessive contacts of the registrant with children.194 As discussed in Part IV of this Comment, the California
notification provision has serious drawbacks which tend to limit its
efficacy. Despite this, a court could find that the legislature had at least
some rational basis for the statute and would most likely defer to the
legislature's policy decision. Therefore, on privacy grounds alone, a
challenge to the sex offender notification statute is unlikely to succeed.

B.

Equal Protection

The essential concept of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that persons similarly situated should be treated alike. 195
When legislation uses classifications, those classifications must not be

Id.
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.5 (West 1995). It has been argued that public
notification interferes in the rehabilitative process; relief from the duty to register via
§ 290.5 is not available until the offender obtains a certificate of rehabilitation. See
Montana, supra note 48, at 584-85.
193. Most child molestations are committed by family members or friends. It is
presumed that had parents suspected or known of the risk posed by the molester, they
would have taken protective measures. Thus, California's notification provision would
be of no help in these cases. See Popkin, supra note I, at 67. "Of the 139,000
confirmed cases of child sexual abuse reported to state child-protective services in 1992,
most victims were thought to have been molested by friends and relatives." Id. See also
infra note 209 and accompanying text.
194. It has been argued that a molester whose identity is known in his neighborhood
will simply molest elsewhere. A paroled child molester confirmed this: "I would go to
some other part of town where no one knew who I was." Popkin, supra note I, at 68.
It is also believed that offenders who experience harassment as a result of notification
will move and fail to re-register, thus impeding law enforcement efforts to monitor such
individuals. In Washington State, a registered offender was evicted from his rented
home and shunned by neighbors after local police distributed a notification flier. Gary
Ridgway said he will register again after moving, and if he is harassed again, "then it's
the hell with their program." Jim Hooker, Megan's Law has a Harsh Prototype, N.J.
REc., Oct. I 0, 1994, at A I.
195. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,439 (1985).
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arbitrary and must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.I 96
Challenges to sex offender statutes have alleged that because the laws do
not distinguish among various "types" of sex offenders, they violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. I97
The protection of children from recidivistic child molesters is a
legitimate state interest. By enacting the notification provision, the
California Legislature has identified a "class" of persons, convicted child
molesters, as potential recidivists. To the extent that the legislature finds
that members of this class are likely to repeat their crimes, the classification is neither arbitrary nor irrational in relation to a legitimate purpose.
The fact that the class may be over-inclusive or under-inclusive does
not in itself invalidate the legislation. 198 The plaintiff in Doe v. Poritz
argued unsuccessfully that as an offender who had completed rehabilitative treatment, he should not be classified with other sex offenders. 199
California's registration and notification requirements apply for the
lifetime of the offender, and require no assessment of the risk the
offender poses to the public. 200 To be relieved from the duty to
register, an offender must obtain a certificate ofrehabilitation and initiate
a legal proceeding. 20 I During the offender's probation or parole,
however, he is not relieved of the duty to register, and is subject to
notification. Despite the overinclusiveness of California's statute,judicial

196. Id. at 439-40. When the classification is a "suspect" class, such as race or
ethnicity, strict scrutiny is the standard of review. Where the classification is not
suspect, only rationality is required. Id.
197. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 413 (N.J. 1995); People v. Adams, 581
N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ill. 1991). See also infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the over- and
under-inclusiveness of the California statute. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
474 (1965) ("[T]his Court has long recognized in equal protection cases that a legislature
may prefer to deal with only part of an evil.") (White, J., dissenting). See also People
v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 642 ("When the legislature creates a statute, it is not required
to solve all the evils of a particular wrong in one fell swoop.").
199. 662 A.2d 367,414 (N.J. 1995). But see State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 107677 (Wash. 1994) (finding that the Washington registration statute did not violate equal
protection, noting that the statute distinguished between offenders who were under
corrective supervision and those who had been released from corrective supervision).
200. Megan's Law provides for a three-tier classification system; those at the first
tier are thought to be of little danger to the public, and are not subject to notification.
See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 378 (N.J. 1995). For example, it is believed that
offenders that have committed incest pose little threat to other children. See Dolbee,
supra note I 87, at E4.
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.5 (West 1988).
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deference to legislative findings of a high likelihood of recidivism
among the targeted class of offenders would probably result in the
failure of an equal protection challenge. 202 As with the other challenges, this one raises legitimate concerns that the legislature would be wise
to consider in fashioning a more effective, less burdensome statute.
IV.

IS PUBLIC NOTIFICATION AN EFFECTIVE MEANS TO PROMOTE
PUBLIC SAFETY? SOME POLICY ISSUES

Widely publicized accounts of children molested by convicted sex
offenders have fueled demands by the public to know if there is an
offender living in their community. Legislators have responded with sex
offender notification statutes. But a closer look at California's notification statute reveals a largely symbolic measure which may do more harm
than good, for several reasons.

A.

The Assumption of Recidivism

The assumption underlying sex offender statutes is that sex offenders
have a high rate of recidivism. Therefore, it is necessary for the safety
of the public that these individuals be closely monitored at all times by
law enforcement agencies. 203 Notification provisions enable concerned
citizens and parents to identify convicted offenders and thus take
preventive measures on behalf of children who may be at risk. Studies
of sex offender recidivism, however, are anything but conclusive, 204

202. But see Justice Stein's dissent in Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,439 (N.J. 1995).
The dissent argued that the court had a duty to inquire further:
The court appears to conclude, however, despite any deficiencies in the
classification and notification process adopted by the Legislature, that its
rationality establishes its constitutionality. That is, because the court concludes
that the Legislature reasonably could determine that these statutes prevent
harm to the public by mandating notice to the community of the whereabouts
of prior sex offenders, the constitution does not prohibit their enactment. I
disagree. The Legislature's value judgment about these laws is entitled to great
respect, but that judgment comprises only one part of the constitutional
equation. The judiciary's task is to complete the equation by evaluating the
legislative determination in the context of settled Constitutional principles.
Those principles are neither negotiable nor flexible.
Id. at 441.
203. The legislative purpose of CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 is "to assure that persons
convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police
surveillance at all times because the Legislature has deemed them likely to commit
similar offenses in the future." In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914,919,663 P.2d 216,217, 191
Cal. Rptr. 658, 659 (1983).
204. One researcher has said that the available data on recidivism and treatment of
child sexual offenders is "in chaos." JOHN J. McMAHON, LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU
HAW., INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: EXPLORING SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
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and reported recidivism rates for various types of sex offenses vary
widely. 205 It has been argued that because of the public outrage over
sex crimes, government funding for scientific studies of sexual disorders
and recidivism has been meager. 206 Offenders convicted of incest are
not generally considered dangerous to other children,207 and when
treated are much less likely to recidivate. 208 Since incest offenders
constitute the largest group of sex offenders committing crimes against
children, the persons subject to notification include many unlikely
recidivists. 209 Studies have also found that the highest rate of recidi-

TO INCARCERATION 63 ( 1989). The available studies are badly flawed because they mix
child molesters with other sexual offenders, reflect only reported offenses, study only
incarcerated offenders, and fail to utilize long-term follow-up. Id. at 19.
205. See Lita Furby et. al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, I 05 PSYCHOL BULL.
3, 12-19 (1989). The authors summarized the results of 42 studies of sex offender
recidivism. Reported rates of recidivism ranged from 3.8% to 40.3%. The authors cited
numerous methodological and practical difficulties in conducting studies in this area as
the reason for such divergent results. Id. at 27. See also A. Nicholas Groth et. al.,
Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, CRIME & DELINQ., July
1982, at 450, 454 (recidivism rates may be inaccurate because of unreported offenses
and because many adult offenders committed their first offense while they were
juveniles). A 1991 study of pedophiles treated at Johns Hopkins Sexual Disorder Clinic
in Baltimore revealed a recidivism rate of about seven percent after five years. Popkin,
supra note I, at 66.
206. See Goode, supra note 29.
207. Researchers distinguish between "fixated" and "regressive" child molesters.
Fixated offenders are those that display an exclusive sexual attraction to children.
Regressive molesters are those that prefer adult sexual partners, but for other motivations
have molested children. Incest offenders generally tend to be regressive molesters, and
are thought to be more amenable to cognitive-behavioral treatments. The regressive
molester does not seek out child victims as the fixated offender does. See KENNETH V.
LANNING, NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD MOLESTERS: A
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS, 1-3 (1986). See also Child Molestation Legislation: Hearings
on S.B. 276 Before the California Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, Apr.
24, 1981, at 8-9 (testimony of Dr.Carolyn Swift, S.W. Community Mental Health
Services of Columbus, Ohio) (stating that the regressed offender who victimizes his own
child tends to do so under stress, or may be reacting to a particular opportunity which
presents itself).
208. See Robert J. McGrath, Sex Offender Risk Assessment and Disposition
Planning: A Review ofEmpirical and Clinical Findings, 35 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 328, 335 (1991) (finding that incest offenders consistently have
the lowest rates of recidivism). See also Bruno M. Cormier et. al., Psychodynamics of
Father Daughter Incest, in DEVIANCY AND THE FAMILY 112 (Clifton D. Bryant & J.
Gipson Wells eds., 1973) (finding that "recidivism in incest is rare" after the incest has
been discovered).
209. Ernie Allen of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has said
that "the child is at greatest risk inside the home." Popkin, supra note I, at 67. See
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vism among sex offenders is among non-violent exhibitionists, or those
convicted of "indecent exposure."210
The public perception which often prompts sex offender legislation
seems to be that child molesters are highly recidivistic and
untreatable. 211 It is true that some types of pedophiles are rarely
treatable. 212 Because all of these types of offenders are included
among those subject to the notification provision, the class is vastly
overinclusive and unnecessarily burdens those individuals that pose no
real danger to the public.

B.

Notification Promotes a False Sense of Security

Public access to registrants' information may promote a false sense of
security. 213 If a "suspected" child molester is not listed in the registry,
this does not mean he is not a sex offender. His crime may have been
committed while he was a juvenile and his records sealed. 214 He may

Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807 n.14 (1985) (citing Jon R. Conte & Lucy
Berliner, Sexual Abuse of Children: Implications for Practice, J. CONTEMP. Soc. WORK
60 I, 603 (1981 ), finding that in 4 7% of the child sexual abuse cases they studied, the
offender was a family member); DIANE DEPANFILIS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., LITERATURE REV. OF SEXUAL ABUSE 5 (1986) (reporting that in an analysis of
reported child sexual abuse cases between 1976 and 1982, 56.5% of abusers were the
natural parent of the victim, 20.9% were other (foster, step) parents, 16.3% were other
relatives, and only 6.3% were unrelated to the victim).
2 I 0. See McGrath, supra note 208, at 334. This is not to say that an incident of
exhibitionism is not traumatic to a child, but that it is questionable whether such an
offense justifies subjecting the offender to public notification. Megan's Law classifies
these offenders as "tier I "offenders, and they are only required to register. See supra
note 200.
211. An Oregon judge's statement reflects the belief that all child molesters can be
expected to reoffend: "One time, I thought of dyeing all child molesters green and telling
children to stay away from green people." Silverman, supra note 70. A member of an
advocacy group for victims of sexual abuse in Tacoma, Washington said of a convicted
offender who was severely harassed by the community, "People like him try to blend
right back into the system and hide themselves in this cloak of normalcy so they can
start molesting again." Sex-Offender Registration Law, supra note 10.
212. See McGrath, supra note 208, at 335-46 (citing factors which tend to make
treatment unsuccessful, including multiple paraphilias, impulsivity, substance abuse, and
psychopathology). See also Lucy Berliner, Nature and Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse,
in A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1994, A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN &
THE LAW 7-8 (finding that offenders that are exclusively sexually interested in children
are the most difficult to treat successfully, but that these tend to be a very small
percentage of all offenders).
213. See Jerusalem, supra note 51, at 247; Montana, supra note 48, at 593-96.
214. See Groth et. al., supra note 205, at 454-55 (finding that the majority of adult
sex offenders committed their first offense while they were juveniles). In New Jersey,
Amanda Wengert was assaulted and murdered by a 20-year-old neighbor whose record
of prior sex offenses was sealed because they were committed when he was a juvenile.
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have been allowed to plead to a lesser offense, which does not trigger
notification. He may have simply failed to register, or to re-register,
upon moving to a new community. 215 Included in this group might be
offenders from other states who have served their time and completed
their parole. Although required to register upon moving to California,
the state has few resources to track such persons. Of course, first time
offenders will not be in the registry, nor will those offenders whose
crimes were not reported or discovered. 216 In short, a parent who
relies on the registry to remove a person from suspicion may in fact be
unwittingly endangering his child. 217
Notification laws that purport to protect children virtually ignore the
fact that the majority of child sexual abuse is perpetrated by family
members. 218 A 900 number will do nothing to protect these children.
Nor will a 900 number protect children from attacks by strangers, which,
though far less frequent than abuse by persons known to the child, often
draw the most publicity and spark widespread outrage. 219
The underinclusiveness of California's notification provision so
severely diminishes its usefulness that it should be asked whether the

Hooker, supra note 194, at A 1. In California, juveniles who have been committed to
the Youth Authority for sex offenses are required to register; however, pursuant to CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE§ 781 (West 1995), they may petition to have the records sealed
five years after the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has terminated, or at age 18.
Juveniles who were not committed to the Youth Authority for conviction of a sex
offense, such as those who received probation, are not required to register. See In re
Bernardino S., 4 Cal. App. 4th 613, 620-21, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 746, 743-44 (1992).
215. See Most Sex Offenders Fail to Report Moves, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr.
5, 1994, at A3 (stating that the California Department of Justice reports that nearly 58%
of sex offenders fail to re-register when they move).
216. See Groth et. al., supra note 205, at 453-54 (reporting that about half of the
offenders with one conviction admitted to one or more undetected offenses). See also
Joseph J. Romero and Linda Meyer Williams, Recidivism Among Convicted Sex
Offenders: A 10-Year Followup Study, 49 FED. PROBATION 58 (1985) (finding that a
large number of offenses are not reported or prosecuted).
217. A supporter of California's 900 number claims that the 900 number has been
effective in identifying some offenders and "in removing others from suspicion." Q &
A: Right and Wrong, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 29, 1995, at 05. Bernard Lu, another
supporter of the 900 number says that it may "avert a possible Polly Klaas situation."
Id. Unfortunately, Mr. Lu is wrong; the man charged with Polly's abduction and murder
was a convicted sex offender, but a 900 number would not have helped her parents avert
the tragedy because he was a stranger to the family. Nor was he from the immediate
area so that he might have been recognized by an alert neighbor.
2 I 8. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
219. The case of Polly Klaas is an example. See supra note 217.
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diversion of resources needed to fund the program is justified. It would
seem that improving the registration program would be far more
efficacious in accomplishing the purpose of protecting the public. 220
C.

Encouragement of Vigilantism

Instances of vigilantism and extreme harassment in response to
community notification are many. 221 Proponents of public notification
laws argue that the laws contain penalties for using the information
obtained to commit a crime against the offender. 222 While most
citizens would not resort to criminal violence, it is unrealistic for
legislatures to assume that the information will not be used to drive the
offender out of the community. 223 Indeed, one would expect that this
would be the natural response of most parents who would not knowingly
expose their children to even a minimal risk. But harassment of
convicted sex offenders simply moves the problem to another neighborhood and increases the risk that the offender will not re-register or will

220. California's SHOP program has been very effective in monitoring sex
offenders, but funds are limited. See discussion infra Part V.
221. In Washington, deputies notified residents that Joseph Gallardo, a convicted
child molester, was about to be released into their neighborhood. The day before he was
to arrive, his house was burned. In Detroit, neighbors of a suspected child molester
vandalized his rented apartment and posted warning signs in front. He moved, and
police do not know where he is. Popkin, supra note 1, at 73. In New Jersey, two men
entered a home where a convicted offender lived and beat up the wrong man. Robert
L. Jackson, Sex-Offender Notification Laws Facing Legal Hurdles, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1995, at A5. A group home for mentally retarded persons in Minnesota was picketed
daily by neighbors when a mentally retarded sex offender was paroled to the home. The
director of the home planned to move because he feared for the safety of the staff and
residents. Rhonda Hillbery, Group Home's Point of Peril: Is the Danger Inside or
Outside?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at A5. Unfortunately, these are not isolated
incidents. The predominant attitude of communities towards sex offenders is: "Yes,
they've served their prison sentence; no, they aren't welcome in my neighborhood."
Dolbee, supra note I 87, at E4.
222. See supra note 191 for a discussion of California's notification provision. See
also Bruce Fein, Community Self-Defense Laws are Constitutionally Sound, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1995, at 38 (arguing that Megan's Law protects offenders from vigilantism because
the community is "admonished against vigilantism and is warned that crimes against the
offender, the offender's family, employer, or school will be unfailingly prosecuted").
223. This was the case for Carl deFlurner, a twice-convicted sex offender who was
paroled in 1994. When neighbors of his sister found out that he intended to stay with
her, the furor was so great that she refused to take him in. He lived in a prison cell for
seven months before prison officials found a halfway house willing to take him. Janny
Scott, Sex Offender Due for Parole, But No Place Will Have Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1994, at Al; Charisse Jones, For a Sex Offender, Freedom is Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 1995, at BI. Edward Martone warns that the "climate of ugly vigilantism" created
by community notification can cause offenders to "run from family ... and seek the
safety of anonymity by hiding out, thus subjecting the public to even greater risk."
Martone, supra note 69.
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reoffend, thus defeating the purpose of the legislation and impeding law
enforcement efforts to monitor these individuals.224

D.

Failure to Reassimilate

Notification may have the negative consequence of interfering with,
or preventing, the rehabilitation of the offender and his successful
reassimilation into the community. Some believe that the stress
experienced by the offender as a result of notification may increase his
likelihood of reoffending.225 The stigma attached to a known sex
offender can impede his ability to find stable employment and housing,
and to establish normal relationships, 226 thus increasing his chance of
reverting to crime.227
For the foregoing reasons, California's notification provision fails to
meet policy goals and does not justify the burden placed on the offender.
The real usefulness of the statute is so limited that the use of scarce
crime-control resources to fund the program is unjustified as well.
Edward Martone writes that the "sole function [of community notification laws] is political-to placate an angry public."228 A responsible
legislature must address these concerns and find real, workable solutions
to the serious problem of child sexual abuse, not empty gestures. Part
V offers some recommendations for a less burdensome, but efficient,
statute.

224. A convicted sex offender said of notification and the public's view of him: "I'm
the scum of the earth. If everyone in the community knows, I'll feel worse about myself.
And the reason people reoffend is that they don't feel good about themselves." Popkin,
supra note I, at 67-68. See Montana, supra note 48, at 582-83 (arguing that "sex
offenders who relocate due to community notification laws tend to relocate to areas
that do not have such laws or to areas that do not strictly enforce their notification
laws," usually low-income areas or inner cities). This "sends a message that one
neighborhood's children are less worthy of protection than another." Dolbee, supra note
I 87, at E4.
225. See Montana, supra note 48, at 585 (when adults ostracize sex offenders, they
may tend to seek out children for companionship). "[C]ertain emotions, such as
'frustration, anger, or sadness,' [may] trigger deviant behavior" as well. Id. (citing
BARRY M. MALETZKY, TREATING THE SEXUAL OFFENDER 153 (1991)).
226. See Hooker, supra note I 94.
227. See McGrath, supra note 208, at 340 (citing studies which show that an
offender with a supportive social network and stable employment is much less likely to
reoffend).
228. Martone, supra note 69.
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V.

ALTERNATIVES TO NOTIFICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
A MORE EFFECTIVE STATUTE

California's sex offender registration pro~am has been a dismal
failure, as have registration laws elsewhere. 29 Lack of resources is
usually cited as the reason. However, a new comprehensive tracking
system has been quite successful in California, and treatment programs
for adult and especially for juvenile offenders may prevent reoffenses.
These proven, successful programs also lack adequate funding, which is
why it is imperative that scarce resources not be diverted to programs of
such limited efficacy as the notification program. 230

A.

California's SHOP System

An experimental program, the Sexual Habitual Offender Program
(SHOP), has been so successful in Northern California that it is being
expanded statewide. 231 The SHOP system identifies parolees that pose
a high risk for recidivism and compiles extensive information on the
offender in a statewide computerized database. 232 This system enables
investigators to connect sex crimes that might occur in different areas of
the state, as well as to link the offenders to unsolved crimes. A
nationwide SHOP system could be very effective in alerting local police
to offenders who move between states.

229. See Most Sex Offenders Fail to Report Moves, supra note 215, at A3 (reporting
that the State of California has lost track of most of its registered sex offenders);
Kenneth Reich, Sex Offender Registration Not Working, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1986, at
6 (the registration law is "not being obeyed, nor effectively enforced"); Marla Williams,
Where Are Sex Offenders? Authorities Say They Lack Resources to Track Them,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at Al (citing lack of resources in Washington State to
enforce the registration law).
230. See James P. Sweeney, State's Child-Molest Hotline Can't Be Called a Ringing
Success, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug. 9, I 995, at A3. During the first month of
operation of the hotline, only one-fourth of the anticipated number of calls was received;
the program, at $IO per call, was intended to pay for itself. Attorney General Dan
Lungren stated that additional funds would be needed from general revenue funds to
sustain the hotline, and additional funds would be needed to compile the local
subdirectories as well.
231. See Kelly Thornton, Bills Aim To Keep Tabs on Abusers, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., May 29, 1994, at Bl. The SHOP program guidelines have been codified at CAL.
PENAL CODE§ 13885 (West 1995).
232. Thornton, supra note 23 I. The information includes a physical description,
genetic information, and detailed information about the offender's crime and method.
Repeat offenders often use the same method of committing crimes. Id.
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The SHOP system includes local efforts to track down registered sex
offenders. 233 A recent task force sweep in San Diego County was
quite successful, resulting in "a barrage of calls from [convicted, but
unregistered, sex offenders] who had heard and wanted to re~ister,"
rather than face a misdemeanor conviction for failure to do so. 2 4 The
California Legislature also recently upgraded the penalty for failure to
register from a misdemeanor to a felony, which no doubt will increase
compliance. A considerable savings would be realized if there were a
provision allowing for automatic termination of the duty to register, at
least for a low risk group, after ten years. 235 Perhaps a longer period
of monitoring could apply to higher risk individuals. In either case, a
risk assessment system should be put in place so that the greatest efforts
of law enforcement personnel can be concentrated on those at a higher
risk of recidivism.
It bas also been argued that electronic monitoring devices would be an
effective and cost-efficient method of supervising high-risk offenders.236 It is a suggestion that merits investigation as a tool for law
enforcement agencies to be able to monitor and easily locate offenders,
while allowing a greater measure of privacy for the offender.

233. See Ed Jahn, Task Force Puts Sex Offenders on Notice, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Apr. 11, 1995, at Bl.
234. Id. A Seattle therapist has said that registration, when enforced, is effective.
"Sex offenders must be convinced they are accountable, otherwise the effort is wasted."
Williams, supra note 229. To ensure adequate monitoring of paroled sex offenders,
many states have included provisions in their statutes which provide measures for
increased supervision. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 1995)
(outlining the strategy of the Florida Sexual Predators Act to include "[p]roviding ...
an adequate number of well-trained probation officers with low caseloads" to ensure that
released sex offenders are closely supervised).
235. See McGrath, supra note 208, at 342 (finding that the risk ofreoffense lessens
greatly over time). But see Berliner, supra note 212, at 8 (claiming that sex offenders
remain at risk "indefinitely," citing examples of a father who sexually abuses his own
daughter, and then does not reoffend for as many as thirty years, when he abuses his
granddaughter). The lack of long-term follow-up studies of convicted sex offenders is
often cited as a serious flaw of studies of recidivism rates over time. See McMahon,
supra note 204, at 19.
236. See Abraham Abramovsky, Megan's Law: Is it Constitutional? And is it
Moral?, N.Y. L. J., July I I, 1995, at 3, JO.
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B.

Increased Sentences, Disallowance of Plea
Bargains to Lesser Offenses

Experts agree that some offenders are rarely treatable and pose such
a risk to society that they should be permanently incarcerated or
committed. 237 To enhance the deterrent effect on potential recidivist
sex offenders, prison sentences should be substantially increased, and a
"life without parole" option made available for the most violent or repeat
offenders. California law provides for a minimum prison term of
twenty-five years for habitual offenders and requires that at least eightyfive percent of the sentence be served. 238 The statute is narrowly
tailored to identify those offenders that pose the greatest risk to the
public. The status of the offender as "habitual" must be admitted by the
defendant in open court or found to be true by a jury.239 Sentences for
first time offenders should also be increased. However, so-called "onestrike" laws for first time violent offenders have been criticized as
"overly Draconian," thereby posing a risk of jury nullification. 240
Prison overcrowding and the lack of funds to build new prisons are
concerns, as is the possibility that victims and their families will be
discouraged from reporting abuse when their attackers are family
members or acquaintances. 241 Finally, sex offenders should not be
allowed to plea bargain to a lesser offense to bypass the registration
requirements, or to receive a lighter sentence. 242

237. See McGrath, supra note 208, at 329.
238. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. 71 (West I 995). "Habitual" is defined as having
been convicted of two or more sex crimes committed by force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim. Id.
239. Id.
240. Crime and Punishment: One-Strike Bill is Not the Answer, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., April 20, 1994, at B6.
241. See One-Strike Alternatives: Life Sentences Would Jam Prisons, Courts, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Apr. 1, 1994, at B6.
242. See Nathaniel J. Pallone, A View from the Front Line, CRIM. JUST. Ennes,
Summer/Fall 1995, at 9, I 0. Professor Pallone reports that Megan Kanka's killer, as a
result of plea-bargains, received a sentence of only seven years for his second sexual
assault conviction. Had he not been allowed to plea-bargain, his sentence would have
been 30 years, and Megan would be alive today. Concern about the expense of a trial
seems to have been the state's justification for allowing the plea-bargain, according to
Professor Pallone. Id.
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C.

Mandatory Treatment Programs

Rehabilitation of some sex offenders is possible through treatment and
should be required while the offender is incarcerated. 243 Therapy
should continue after the offender is paroled to ensure that he does not
relapse during his transition back into the community. 244 Development
of successful treatment programs has been hampered by the paucity of
reliable studies. 245 Furthermore, treatment programs are subject to the
same lack of resources as are research programs. 246 For those offenders who are amenable to treatment, such programs would surely be more
cost-effective over the long term than would lifetime incarceration.
A more difficult question arises with regard to those violent repeat
offenders or those deemed to be "mentally disordered" and at extremely
high risk for reoffense. A new California law allows commitment to a
mental institution for up to two years after the offender serves his prison
sentence. 247 While this may increase the possibility that the offender

243. See Janice K. Marques et. al., Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment on
Sex Offender Recidivism, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 28, 49-50 (Mar. 1994) (reporting
that results of a study of treated sex offenders were "promising" in controlling
recidivism); McGrath, supra note 208, at 329 (outcomes of recent studies were
encouraging that sex offender recidivism could be substantially reduced through effective
therapy); see also Goode, supra note 29 (reporting that in 1993 only 11,200 of the
85,000 prisoners classified as sex offenders were enrolled in treatment programs).
244. See McGrath, supra note 208, at 342 (the period of greatest risk of recidivism
is the first year following release).
245. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
246. See Goode, supra note 29.
247. Assembly Bill 888, enacted on October 11, 1995 amended CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 6250, 6600 (West 1995). The procedure requires a full professional
evaluation, as well as a court or jury to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
person is a sexually violent predator. A California Superior Court judge upheld the
constitutionality of California's civil commitment statute in the state's first test case. See
Catalina Ortiz, 'Sexual Predator' Law Upheld by Court, SAN DIEGO UNION TRJB., Feb.
I 0, 1996, at A3. The case will be appealed to a higher court. Id.
A similar statute in Washington was found unconstitutional as violative of due process,
double jeopardy, and the ex post facto clause. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744
(W.D. Wash. 1995). But see Wisconsin v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1995)
(upholding the civil commitment statute in Wisconsin). The Supreme Court of Kansas
found its states' Sexually Violent Predator Act violative of due process; the case was
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and has been granted certiorari and will be heard
during the 1996-97 term. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), cert. granted sub
nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996). The outcome of Hendricks will no
doubt influence legislation in all states.
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can be rehabilitated with intensive treatment, it may not be enough;
lifetime incarceration or chemical treatment may seem severe, but may
be the only options available for these most dangerous offenders.
D.

Mandatory Background Checks For Child-Related Employment

The vast majority of calls thought necessary to the 900 number
concern persons working closely with children, including daycare
workers, coaches, community recreation programs, camp counselors, and
teachers. Researchers agree that the offenders who pose the greatest
danger to children are "fixated" offenders, those who are exclusively
sexually interested in children. 248 These types of offenders actively
seek out potential child victims and often attempt to secure jobs that will
give them access to children. 249 A mandatory background check of all
persons seeking such positions should alleviate parents' concerns and
assure them that the person working with their child has not been
convicted of a sex offense against a child. 250 The requirement that
persons seeking child-related employment sign a release form for the
background check should have a strong deterrent effect on convicted
child molesters.
E.

Safety Education Programs, Community Awareness,
and Parental Responsibility

Schools, preschools, and daycare centers should continue to instruct
even the youngest children in appropriate safety measures and "strangerdanger" situations. Because of the high rate of intrafamilial sexual
abuse, children must also be taught what constitutes appropriate adultchild physical interaction and be encouraged to confide in a teacher
without fear of reprisals, humiliation, or embarrassment. Childcare
professionals must be instructed in the appropriate methods of questioning a child about possible abuse and must know how to react appropriately when the child does reveal that she has been abused. Parents
should realize that only a small number of potential child molesters,

For an analysis of the constitutional issues inherent in civil commitment statutes, see
Peter A. Zamoyski, Comment, Will California's "One Strike" Law Stop Sexual
Predators, or Is a Civil Commitment System Needed?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1249
(1995).
248. See, e.g., LANNING, supra note 207.
249. See Berliner, supra note 212, at 8.
250. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§ 5-2-12-1 (Burns Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 581 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (providing a registry to schools and childrelated organizations with a warning that the organization may incur civil liability for
employing any person listed on the register).
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those already convicted, are known to police and monitored. Education
is a powerful tool in preventing child abuse; parents and teachers can
learn to recognize the signs of child sexual abuse and to take appropriate
measures. Safety precautions should be reinforced constantly by parents
and teachers and through public campaigns aimed at children, such as
public service messages during television programs.251
F.

Reform Judicial Procedures for Child Sex Abuse Cases

The difficulty of dealing with child witnesses and the inevitable
trauma to children as a result of judicial proceedings in sex abuse cases
has prompted many legal professionals to call for reform of procedures
in these cases to alleviate the stress of the child involved.252 Children
are especially susceptible to suggestion and may become easily confused,
resulting in conflicting, hence less credible, testimony. 253 The use of
videotaped testimony has been suggested to protect children from
embarrassment and from the intimidation of facing their attacker in the
courtroom. 254 Judge Charles B. Schudson has argued that evidentiary
requirements should be reformed to accommodate the special needs of
the child witness, such as exceptions to the hearsay rule, so that
statements made by the child to teachers, doctors, or others may be
admitted as evidence. 255 The legislature would be wise to recognize
the special needs and problems of children as witnesses in abuse cases
and to make the necessary reforms. Offenders will not be punished,

251. See DEPANFILIS, supra note 209, at 13-16 (detailing several child sexual abuse
prevention programs for parents, professionals, and children). But see RICHARD A.
GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA 15-16 (1991) (arguing that sex abuse prevention
programs can "plant seeds" in the minds of children and engender confusion as to where
to draw the line between innocent touching and sexual abuse).
252.
See generally JAMES SELKIN, THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991) for a comprehensive discussion of the issues involved and reform
recommendations.
253. See Karen Saywitz, Children in Court: Principles of Child Development for
Judicial Application, in A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, 1994 A.B.A.
CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 15-44.
254. Id. See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that an
accused's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against her was not violated by
allowing the plaintiff, a six-year-old child, to testify by means of a one-way closed
circuit television).
255. See Charles B. Schudson, Special Techniques to Assist Child Witnesses in
Court: The Judicial Tradition of Flexibility and Innovation, in A JUDICIAL PRIMER ON
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, 1994 A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN AND TIIE LAW 49-60.
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treated, or monitored until they are convicted; getting "caught" will put
many offenders on the road to recovery.

G.

Address the Problem of Juvenile Offenders

A majority of convicted sex offenders committed their first offense
while they were juveniles.256 Often, the juvenile sex offender has been
molested himself, thus repeating a cycle of abuse, which may continue
unless there is intervention. 257 Successful prevention of sex offenses
by adults against children must begin with intervention and treatment of
juvenile offenders, who are too often tomorrow's adult offenders.
Sexual offenses against children continue to increase, and concerned
parents are justified in demanding that something be done. Focusing
resources and manpower on effective enforcement of registration,
expanded treatment programs, enhanced prison sentences, and education
programs will be far more effective than California's notification
provision in protecting children from sexual abuse.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Sex offender notification is largely symbolic and an ineffective means
of protecting children from sexual abuse. Retroactively applied statutes
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution; other constitutional protections are implicated, and the
limited efficacy of the notification statute does not justify the burden it
places on the offender. Notification may do more harm than good by
impeding the offender's rehabilitation and by providing an illusory sense
of security to the community. Lack of resources is a continuing problem
in crime control, but responsible legislators should not shift the law
enforcement function to the public under the guise of protection. Far
more effective alternatives are available which do not burden the
constitutional rights of convicted sex offenders.
ROBIN L. DEEMS

256.
257.

See Groth et. al., supra note 205, at 454-55.
See Mareva Brown, When Kids Molest Kids, State's Justice System Stumbles,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 31, 1993, at Al (reporting that therapy programs are
overcrowded, that problems with legal proof and testimony of young victims prevent
many prosecutions, or that sexual abuse is simply not recognized by parents, teachers,
or police).
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